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ABSTRACT 
The main ingredients of Spohn's theory of epistemic beliefs are (1) a functional 
representation of an epistemic state called a disbelief function and (2) a rule for 
revising this function in light of new information. The main contribution of this 
paper is as follows. First, we provide a new axiomatic definition of an epistemic 
state and study some of its properties. Second, we study some properties of an 
alternative functional representation of an epistemic state called a Spohnian belief 
function. Third, we state a rule for combining disbelief functions that is mathe- 
matically equivalent o Spohn's belief revision rule. Whereas Spohn's rule is 
defined in terms of the initial epistemic state and some features of the final 
epistemic state, the rule of combination is defined in terms of the initial epistemic 
state and the incremental epistemic state representing the information gained. 
Fourth, we state a rule of subtraction that allows one to recover the addendum 
epistemic state from the initial and final epistemic states. Fifth, we study some 
properties of our rule of combination. One distinct advantage of our rule of 
combination is that besides belief revision, it can be used to describe an initial 
epistemic state for many variables when this information is given as several 
independent epistemic states each involving few variables. Another advantage of 
our reformulation is that we can show that Spohn's theory of epistemic beliefs 
shares the essential abstract features of probability theory and the Dempster-Shafer 
theory of belief unctions. One implication of this is that we have a ready-made 
algorithm for propagating disbelief functions using only local computation. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper is about Spohn's theory of epistemic beliefs [1, 2]. Spohn's 
theory is an elegant, simple, and powerful calculus designed to represent and 
reason with plain human beliefs. 
The motivation behind Spohn's theory is the need for (1) a formalism to 
represent plain epistemic belief and (2) procedures for revising beliefs when 
new information is obtained. As Spohn [2, p. 315] notes, probability theory is 
inadequate for this purpose for several reasons. I believe A is true cannot be 
represented by P(A)  = 1 because a probability of 1 is incorrigible, that is, 
P (A  [ B) = 1 for all B such that P (A I  B) is well defined. However, plain 
belief is clearly corrigible. I may believe it is snowing outside but when I look 
out the window and observe that it has stopped snowing, I now believe that it is 
not snowing outside. Nor can we represent I believe A is true with P (A)  _> 
1 - e ,  say, where e___ 0 is some small number, because, according to the 
notion of plain belief, if I believe A is true and I believe B is true, then I 
believe A and B is true. However, if P(A)  _> 1 - ~ and P(B)  >_ 1 - ~, 
then it is not necessary that P(A  and B) >_ 1 - E. The Dempster-Shafer 
theory of belief functions [3, 4] suffers from the same problems. Once we 
assume Bel(A) = 1, no further evidence will reduce belief in A to less than 
1. 
The main ingredients of Spohn's theory are (1) a functional representation f 
an epistemic state called a natural (or ordinal) conditional function and (2) a 
rule for revising this function in light of new information. Since the values of a 
natural conditional function represent degrees of disbeliefs, we call such a 
function a disbelief unction. Like a probability distribution function, a 
disbelief unction for a variable is completely specified by its values for the 
singleton subsets of configurations of the variable. Spohn [2, pp. 318-320] has 
interpreted the values of a disbelief unction as infinitesimal probabilities (see 
also Pearl [5]). Smets (private communication) and Dubois and Prade [6] have 
pointed out that a disbelief unction can be interpreted as the negative of the 
logarithm of a possibility function as studied by, for example, Zadeh [7] and 
Dubois and Prade [8]. 
The main contribution of this paper is as follows. First, we provide an 
axiomatic definition of a consistent epistemic state. Some of the axioms we 
propose are different from the ones proposed by Spohn. Our axioms are a little 
easier to understand, but we show that the two sets of axioms are mathemati- 
cally equivalent. These axioms are also found in Gardenfors [9]. 
Second, we study some properties of an alternative functional representation 
of a consistent epistemic state called a Spohnian belief function. Although the 
definition is stated in Ref. 1, there is not much else in there about his function. 
We state several properties of belief functions. When compared to disbelief 
functions, belief functions are easier to interpret. But since they contain 
redundant information, they are harder to manipulate mathematically. 
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Third, we state a rule of combination for disbelief unctions that is mathe- 
matically equivalent to Spohn's belief revision rule. Whereas Spohn's rule is 
defined in terms of the initial epistemic state and some features of the final 
epistemic state, the rule of combination is defined in terms of the initial 
epistemic state and the incremental epistemic state representing the information 
gained. The rule of combination for disbelief unctions is pointwise addition. 
Fourth, we state a rule of subtraction that always allows one to recover the 
addendum epistemic state from the initial and final epistemic states. This rule is 
useful in cases where information gained is expressed in terms of the final 
epistemic state, as it allows us to recover the addendum epistemic state that is 
combined with the initial to obtain the final. The subtraction rule is also useful 
for nonmonotonic reasoning when it becomes necessary to retract he conclu- 
sion of an earlier inference without influencing conclusions drawn using other 
means. The rule of subtraction for disbelief unctions is pointwise subtraction. 
Fifth, we study some properties of our rule of combination. Spohn's belief 
revision rule is formulated to revise an epistemic state in light of new 
information. On the other hand, the rule of combination described in this paper 
is more flexible. It also can be used to describe an initial epistemic state for 
many variables when this information is provided as several independent 
epistemic states each involving few variables. The initial epistemic state for all 
variables is then obtained by combining these independent epistemic states 
using the rule of combination. This is a distinct advantage of our reformulation 
of Spohn's belief revision rule. 
Another advantage of our reformulation is that we can show that Spohn's 
theory of epistemic beliefs shares the essential abstract features of probability 
theory and the Dempster-Shafer theory of belief functions as described by 
Shenoy and Shafer [10, 11]. These features are (1) a functional representation 
of knowledge (or beliefs), (2) a rule of marginalization, and (3) a rule of 
combination. In Shenoy and Shafer [10, 11], we also state three axioms for the 
marginalization and combination rules that enable one use local computation i
the calculation of the marginals of a joint function without explicitly having to 
compute the joint function. In this paper we show that rules of marginalization 
and combination for disbelief unctions atisfy the required three axioms. One 
implication of this is that we have a ready-made algorithm for propagating 
disbelief functions using only local computation as described in detail in 
Shenoy and Shafer [11]. 
An outline of the remainder of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we 
provide an axiomatic definition of a consistent epistemic state and study some 
of its properties. 
In Section 3, we introduce the notation. We use the multivariate framework 
and restrict ourselves to the finite case: the number of variables is finite, and 
each variable has a finite frame. Our motivation here is easier comprehension. 
In Section 4, we define disbelief functions and the marginalization peration. 
Most of the material in this section is due to Spohn. 
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In Section 5, we define and study some properties of an alternative represen- 
tation of a consistent epistemic state that we call a Spohnian belief function. 
In Section 6, we state and describe Spohn's rules for revision of beliefs. 
Spohn has described two rules for belief revision called A,o~-conditionaliza- 
tion and )~-conditionalization. A,ot-conditionalization is a special case of 
~-conditionalization. Most of the material in this section is due to Spohn. 
In Section 7, we state a rule of combination for disbelief unctions and then 
show that Spohn's A,ot-conditionalization rule for belief revision can be 
expressed in terms of the rule of combination. 
In Section 8, first, we state a rule of subtraction for disbelief unctions. 
Second, given the final and initial disbelief unctions, we show that we can 
always subtract the latter from the former to recover the disbelief function that 
was added to the initial to obtain the final. Third, we show that Spohn's 
h-conditionalization rule for belief revision and our rule of combination are 
mathematically equivalent. 
In Section 9, first, we state some elementary properties of the rule of 
combination. Second, we illustrate how an initial disbelief unction for many 
variables can be constructed by combining independent disbelief functions each 
of which involves only a few variables. We sketch what we mean by 
independent disbelief unctions. Third, we show that the rules for marginaliz- 
ing and combining disbelief functions atisfy the three axioms stated by Shenoy 
and Shafer [10, 11] for computing marginals using local computation. 
Finally, in Section 10, we conclude with a short discussion of what we have 
accomplished in this paper. 
Some terminology we use in this paper is different from that used by Spohn 
[1, 2]. In reference to an epistemic state, what Spohn calls "consistent and 
deductively closed" we simply call "consistent," and what Spohn calls "net 
content" we simply call "content." Regarding functional representations of an 
epistemic state, what Spohn calls "a natural conditional function" we simply 
call "a disbelief unction," and the function whose values are referred to by 
Spohn as "degrees of firmness of belief" we simply call "a Spohnian belief 
function." 
Finally, we would like to mention that there is more to Spohn's theory than 
that discussed here. Analogous to the concept of conditional independence in 
probability theory, Spohn defines conditional independence with respect o 
disbelief unctions and states many results regarding this concept (see also 
Hunter [12]). We strongly recommend that the reader read Spohn [1] to 
appreciate first-hand the elegance, simplicity, and power of Spohn's theory. 
2. CONSISTENT EPISTEMIC STATES 
In this section, we will define axiomatically a consistent epistemic state. 
Some of our axioms are different from those used by Spohn, but the two sets of 
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axioms are equivalent. Next, we describe a characterization f a consistent 
epistemic state due to Spohn. 
Consider a variable X. Let ~¢x denote a finite set of possible values of X 
such that exactly one is true. We shall call ~x  a frame for X. Assume 
further that ~x  is defined such that the propositions regarding X that are of 
interest are precisely those of the form "The true value of X is in A"  where 
A is a subset of ~x.  Thus the propositions regarding X that are of interest are 
in a one-to-one correspondence with the subsets of ~¢x [4, p. 36]. 
The correspondence b tween subsets and propositions i  useful, because it 
translates the logical notions of conjunction, disjunction, implication, and 
negation into the set-theoretic notions of intersection, union, inclusion, and 
complementation [4, pp. 36-37]. Thus, if A and B are two subsets of ~¢x, 
and A' and B' are the corresponding propositions, then A n B corresponds 
to the conjunction of A' and B', A 13 B corresponds to the disjunction of A' 
and B', A c_ B if and only if A' implies B', and A is the set-theoretic 
complement of B with respect to Wx (written as A = - B) if and only if A' 
is the negation of B'. Notice also that the proposition that corresponds to Q is 
false, and the proposition that corresponds to ~/x is true. If A is a proper, 
nonempty subset of #x ,  we shall refer to the proposition that corresponds to 
A as contingent. Henceforth, we will simply refer to a proposition by its 
corresponding subset. The set of subsets of ~x  will be denoted by 2 ~x. 
In an epistemic state for X, some propositions are believed to be true (or 
simply, believed), some are believed to be false (or simply, disbelieved), and 
the remainder are neither believed nor disbelieved. Logical consistency re- 
quires that these beliefs satisfy certain conditions (axioms). A definition of a 
consistent epistemic state is as follows. 
DEFINITION 1 An epistemic state is said to be consistent if the following 
five axioms are satisfied: 
A1. For any propositions A, exactly one of the following conditions 
holds: 
(i) A is believed; 
(ii) A is disbelieved; 
(iii) A is neither believed nor disbelieved. 
A2. ~x  is (always) believed. 
A3. A is believed if and only if - A is disbelieved. 
A4. If A is believed and B _ A, then B is believed. 
AS. If A and B are believed, then A n B is believed. 
Some simple consequences of Definition 1 are as follows. 
PROPOSITION 1 The following conditions always hold in any consistent 
epistemic state: 
A6. Q is (always) disbelieved. 
AT. If A is disbelieved and B c_ A, then B is disbelieved. 
All. If A and B are disbelieved, then A O B is disbelieved. 
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Ag. If A is not believed, then this does not necessarily imply that -A  
must be believed; it is possible that -A  is also not believed. And 
if A is not disbelieved, then this does not necessarily imply that 
-A  must be disbelieved; it is possible that -A  is also not 
disbelieved. 
A10. If ~ denotes the set of all believed propositions, then n M ,: Q .  
A l l .  If ~ denotes the set of all believed propositions, then A ~ 
whenever A _D (O ~3 for some g'  ___ ~. 
Proof A6 follows from A2 and A3. A7 follows from A4 and A3. A8 
follows from A5 and A3. 
To show that A9 is true, consider an epistemic state in which the only 
proposition that is believed is *¢, the only proposition that is disbelieved is Q,  
and all other propositions are neither believed nor disbelieved. Clearly, this 
epistemic state satisfies axioms A1-A5. 
To show A10, note that by repeated application of A5, (O g) ¢ g. And 
from A6, it follows that n ~ ,: O .  
Finally, to show Al l ,  note that by repeated application of A5, (n  ~3 ~ ~, 
and since A _D (O ~9, it follows from A4 that A ~ g. 
It is clear from axioms A1 and A3 that we can specify a consistent epistemic 
state simply by listing all propositions that are believed. Then axiom A3 tells 
us exactly which propositions are disbelieved. And from axiom A1, the 
remaining propositions are neither believed nor disbelieved. 
Let g denote the set of all propositions (subsets) that are believed, and let 
denote the set of all propositions that are disbelieved in some consistent 
epistemic state. Theorem 1 gives a characterization f g, and its corollary 
gives a characterization f 9. 
THEOREM 1 Suppose ~ denotes the set of all propositions that are 
believed in some epistemic state for X. Then the epistemic state is 
consistent if and only if there exists a unique nonempty subset C of ~fx 
such that 
~= {Ae2*X lA  ~_ C} 
Proof (Sufficiency) Assume that the epistemic state is consistent. Consider 
the proposition O :~. It follows from A10 that n g ,: Q .  The sufficiency part 
of the proof follows by letting C = n ~. 
(Necessity). Suppose ~ = {A ~2'fXlA D_ C} for some nonempty subset 
C of Wx- We will show that the epistemic state satisfies axioms A1-A5. First 
note that A1 and A3 are satisfied by definition. To show A2, note that 
~x  ~ C. Therefore, ~fx e :~, that is, ~x  is believed. To show ,4,4, suppose 
that A is believed and B D A. Since A is believed, A E ~. Therefore, 
A D C. Since B D A, B D C. Therefore, B ~ ~, that is, B is believed. To 
On Spohn's Rule for Revision of Beliefs 155 
show A5, suppose that A and B are believed, that is, A and B belong to ~. 
By hypothesis, A _D C and B _~ C. Hence, A f) B _~ C. Therefore, (A Q 
B) ~ ~, that is, A tq B is believed. 
COROLLARY a'O THEOREM 1 Suppose ~ denotes the set of  all proposi- 
tions that are disbelieved in some epistemic state for X. Then the 
epistemic state is consistent if and only if there exists a unique proper 
subset D of YCx such that 
~= {A~2"X IAC_D } 
Proof The proof follows from Theorem 1 and axiom A3. Note that 
D- - -C .  
The characterization f M in Theorem 1 (but not Theorem 1 itself) is due to 
Spohn [1, p. 108]. Spohn defines a consistent epistemic state as one that 
satisfies A1, A3, A10, and A11, and consequently Theorem 1 follows trivially 
from A10 and Al l .  It follows from Theorem 1 that our definition of a 
consistent epistemic state (axioms A1-A5) is equivalent to Spohn's (A1, A3, 
A10, and A11). 
Subset C in Theorem 1 is called the content of the consistent epistemic 
state. Note that the content constitutes a complete specification of an epistemic 
state. Thus another simple corollary of Theorem 1 is that in a frame ~¢x 
consisting of n elements, there are exactly 2 n _ 1 distinct possible consistent 
epistemic states (corresponding to each nonempty subset of ~ as the content). 
The content C represents the smallest believed proposition, and D =-  C 
represents he largest disbelieved proposition. 
EXAMPLE 1 (Consistent epistemic states) Consider a frame ~= { x,y,z}.  
Table 1 lists all seven possible consistent epistemic states. 
Epistemic states 1, 2, and 3 represent states of complete beliefs; each 
proposition is either believed or disbelieved. States 4-7 represent incomplete 
beliefs. Epistemic state 7 represents a state of complete ignorance in which 
nothing is believed or disbelieved (except, of course, the frame, which is 
always believed, and the empty set, which is always disbelieved). 
3. VARIABLES, CONFIGURATIONS, AND PROPOSITIONS 
In this section, we introduce the notation that will be used in the rest of the 
paper. We use the multivariate framework because, even though it does not 
generalize readily to the continuous case, it is more intuitive and easier to 
comprehend than the measurable-subset framework used by Spohn [1, 2]. 
Consider a variable X. The symbol ~¢x denotes the set of possible values of 
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X. We assume that one and only one of the elements of ~x  can be the true 
value of X.  We call ~x the frame for X. For example, suppose we are 
interested in determining whether a person is a pacifist or not. We can 
construct a variable P whose frame has two elements: p (for pacifist) and 
-p  (not pacifist). 
Let 5 r denote the set of all variables. In this paper we will be concerned 
only with the case where Y is finite. We will also assume that all the variables 
in S have finite frames. 
We will often deal with nonempty subsets of variables in :~'. Given a 
nonempty subset g of ~', let #g denote the Cartesian product of #x  for X in 
g, that is, 
*g = × { I X g} 
We can think of the set ~g as the set of possible values of the joint variable g. 
Accordingly, we call ~g the frame for g. Also, we will refer to elements of 
#g as configurations of g. We will use this terminology even when g 
consists of a single variable. Thus we will refer to elements of #x  as 
configurations ofX. We will use lower case, boldface letters such as x, y to 
denote configurations. Also, if x is a configuration of g and y is a configura- 
tion of h, and g f') h = 9 ,  then (x,y) will denote a configuration of g LI h. 
Projection of configurations simply means dropping extra coordinates; if 
( r , -  q, -p )  is a configuration of { R,Q,P}, for example, then the projection 
of ( r ,~q,-p)  to {R,P} is simply (r,-p), which is a configuration of 
{ R, P}.  If g and h are sets of variables, h c_ g, and x is a configuration of g, 
then we will let x ~ h denote the projection of x to h. 
By extension of a subset of a frame to a subset of a larger frame, we mean a 
cylinder set extension. If g and h are sets of variables, h ___ g, and A is a 
subset of ~h, then the extension of A to g is A × ~g_ h' We will let A ~ g 
denote the extension of A to g. For example, consider three variables R, P ,  Q 
with frames g/R = {r,-r}, ~¢p = {p , -p} ,  and ~¢Q = {q,-q}, respec- 
tively. Then the extension of {(r, -p ) ,  ( -  r,p)} (which is a subset of #iR.P}) 
to {R,P,Q} is 
{(r,-p,q),  ( r , -p , -q ) ,  ( - r ,  p, q), ( - r ,p , -q )}  
Note that the propositions corresponding to A and A T g are logically equiva- 
lent. 
We will denote the set of all natural numbers by ~ and the set of integers by 
Y2; ~1 = {0, 1, 2, " "  } and Y2 = { - - .  , -2 ,  -1 ,  0, 1, 2, " "  }. The extended 
set of natural numbers consists of the set of all natural numbers to which a 
symbol, +oo, has been added with the following properties. If x e ~1, then (i), 
x < +co and (ii) x + +oo = +~.  The extended natural number set is 
denoted by ~! +. Similarly, we will let ~+ denote the extended set of integers 
158 Prakash P. Shenoy 
consisting of set of all integers to which two symbols +~ and -~ have been 
added with the following properties. I f  x•~2, then (i) -oo < x < +~,  (ii) 
x+ +oo = +0% and(iii) x+ -oo = -~.  
4. DISBELIEF FUNCTIONS 
The basic functional representation f an epistemic state in Spohn's theory is 
called an ordinal conditional function in Spohn [1, p. 115] and a natural 
conditional function in Spohn [2, p. 316]. We simply call this function a 
disbelief unction. 
DEFINITION 2 [2, P. 316] A disbelief unction for g is a function 
~:2*g --" ~1 ÷ such that 
DO. 6({w})e E for all w e ~¢/g; 
D1. There exists a configuration w • ~g for which 6({w}) = 0; 
D2. For any A • (2'~g - {~}) ,  6(A) = MIN{5({w}) Iw•A};  and 
03. ~(Q)= +~.  
Note that although a disbelief unction is defined for the set of all subsets of 
~g, it is completely specified by its values for each singleton subset of ~ .  
A disbelief unction is a complete representation f a consistent epistemic 
state. To see what propositions are believed in state 6, consider the subset 
C = {w • ~16({w})  = 0}. By condition D1 in Definition 2, C is always 
nonempty. C represents the content of the epistemic state; that is, A is 
believed in state 6 iff A _D C. Thus A is believed in state 6 iff 6 ( -A )  > 0; 
A is disbelieved in state 6 iff 6 (A)> 0; and A is neither believed nor 
disbelieved in state 6 iff 6(A) = 6( -A)  = 0. 
A disbelief unction consists of more than a representation f a consistent 
epistemic state. It also includes degrees of belief and disbelief. I f  6(A) > 0, 
then 6(A) can be interpreted as the degree of disbelief in proposition A; that 
is, A is more disbelieved than B if di(A) > 6(B) > 0. And if d i ( -A)  > 0, 
then 6( -A)  can be interpreted as the degree of belief for A, that is, A is 
more believed than B if 6 ( -A )  > ~( -B)  > 0. 
Consider the following disbelief unction for g: 6({w}) = 0 for all w ~ ~¢g. 
This means that the only proposition that is disbelieved is Q and the only 
proposition that is believed is ~¢g. We shall call such a disbelief function 
vacuous. It represents a state of complete ignorance. 
PROPOSITION 2 [1, P. 115] Suppose 6 is a disbelief function for g. Then 
D4. For each A •2~g,  either 6(A) = 0 or ~( -A)  = 0 or both. 
DS. For each A, B~2'%,  6(A U B)= MIN {iS(A), 6(B)}. 
Proof D4 follows from condition D1 in Definition 2, and D5 follows from 
condition D2 in Definition 2. 
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Marginalization 
Suppose (5 is a disbelief function for g. Suppose h c_ g. We may be 
interested only in propositions regarding variables in h. In this case, we would 
like to marginalize (5 to h. The following definition of marginalization is
motivated by the fact that each proposition A ~ 2*h about variables in h can 
be regarded as a proposition A T g e 2 *g about variables in g. 
DEFtNmON 3 Suppose ~ is a disbelief unction for g, and suppose 
h c_ g. The marginal of  (5 for h, denoted by (5~h, is a disbelief function 
for h given as follows: 
6~h(A)=6(ATe)=MIN{6({(x ,y )} ) Ix~A,y~YCg_h} (1) 
for all A ~2 ~h. 
In particular, if A is a singleton subset, that is, A = {x} for some x ~ ~'h, 
then (1) simplifies to 
~h({x}) = MIN {6({(x ,y)}) ly~ g-~}. 
Note that if 6 is a disbelief unction for g and k _ h ~ g, then ((5Sh)*k = 
6~ k. In words, if we regard marginalization as reduction of ~t by deletion of 
variables, then the order in which the variables are deleted makes no difference 
in the final answer. 
EXAMPLE 2 (Disbelief function and marginalization) We would like to 
determine whether a stranger (about whom we know nothing) is a pacifist or 
not depending on whether or not he is a Republican and whether or not he is a 
Quaker. Consider three variables R,Q, and P. R has two possible values: r 
(for Republican), - r  (not Republican); Q has two values: q (Quaker) and 
-q  (not Quaker); and P has two possible values: p (pacifist) and -p  (not 
pacifist). Our belief that most Republicans are not pacifists and that most 
Quakers are pacifists is represented by the disbelief unction 6 for { R,Q,P} 
shown in Table 2 (the construction of this disbelief unction will be explained 
in Section 9). 
Note that the marginal of (5 for R is the vacuous disbelief unction for R, 
~'{R}({r}) = 6~{R}({-r}) = O. 
Thus in epistemic state 6, we neither believe he is a Republican or that he is 
not a Republican. Similarly, note that the marginals of (5 for { Q} and { P} are 
also vacuous. The marginal of (5 for {R,P} is as follows: 
6+{R'P}({r,p}) = 1 
6 '{R 'P}( l r , -p})  = 6HR'e}({ - - r ,p})  = (5 ,{R,e}({_r , _p})  = 0 
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Table 2. A Disbelief Function for (R ,Q ,P}  
w ~({w}) 
(r,q,p) 1 
(r,q, -p )  2 
(r,--q,p) 1 
(r, -q ,  -p )  0 
( - r ,q ,p )  0 
( - r ,q , -p )  2 
( - r ,  - q,p) 0 
( - r , -q , -p )  0 
Thus we disbelieve pacifist Republicans (to degree 1). Similarly, note that the 
marginal of 6 for {Q,P} is as follows: 
6 '{O'P}({q , -p})  = 2 
6~{Q'P}({q,p}) = 6+{Q'P}({--q,p}) = 6~{Q'P}({ -q , -p})  = 0 
Thus we disbelieve pacifist Republicans (to degree 1). Similarly, note that the 
marginal of 6 for {R,Q} is as follows: 
6+{"'O}({r,q}) = 1 
~qR,e l ({ r , _q}  ) = ~qR,e~({_r ,q} ) = ~R,O~({_r , _q})  = 0 
Thus we disbelieve republican Quakers (to degree 1). 
5. SPOHNIAN BELIEF FUNCTIONS 
As we saw in the previous section, a disbelief unction models degrees of 
disbelief or disbelieved propositions directly whereas it models degrees of 
belief for believed propositions only indirectly; if A is a believed proposition, 
then the degree of belief for A is 6 ( -A) .  Can we model both beliefs and 
disbeliefs directly? The answer is yes. We call such a representation a 
(Spohnian) belief function. However, as we shall see, belief functions are not 
as easy to manipulate mathematically asdisbelief unctions. This is because a
belief function has redundant information: If we believe proposition A to 
degree ~, then we must disbelieve -A  to degree or. Including both these 
statements in the definition of a disbelief unction is the main cause of the 
difficulty. Nevertheless, the ease of interpretation f a belief function makes its 
study worthwhile. 
DEFxmrION 4 [1, P. 116] A (Spohnian) belief function for  g is a 
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Table 3. The Belief Function/3 Corresponding toDisbelief Function (5 
w ~({w}) t3({w}) 
(r,q,p) 1 -1 
(r,q, -p)  2 -2 
( r , -q ,p )  1 -1 
(r, -q ,  -p )  0 0 
(~r,q,p) 0 0 
(~ r,q, -p)  2 -2 
( - r , -q ,p )  0 0 
( - r , -q , -p )  0 0 
function /3:2"g ~ ?2 + such that 
13(A) = if iS (A)>0 
if (5(A) = 0 
for all A ~ 2 rcg where ~ is some disbelief function for g. 
The number/3(A) is interpreted as the degree of belief in proposition A. A 
is believed iff /3(A) > 0, A is disbelieved iff 13(A) < 0, and A is neither 
believed nor disbelieved iff 13(A) = 0. Furthermore, if 13(A) > 13(B) > 0, 
then A is more believed than B, and if 13(A) < 13(B) < 0, then A is more 
disbelieved than B. Propositions Q and ~ are the extreme cases. O is the 
most disbelieved proposition [/3(Q) = -oo], and ~¢g is the most believed 
proposition [13(~U,g) = +~].  
EXAMPLE 3 (Spohnian belief function) Consider the disbelief unction 5 for 
{R,Q,P} from Example 2. Table 3 shows the corresponding belief function 
13. 
The disbelief function that produces a given belief function is unique and can 
be recovered from the belief function. 
THEOREM 2 Suppose 13 is the belief function for g given by the disbelief 
function & Then 
for aliA ~2~g. 
{0 if 13(A) _> 0 
i f /3(A) < 0 
Proof Suppose A is such that 13(A) > 0. Then from the definition of/3, it 
must be true that 13(A) = 5( -A) .  Therefore from condition D4, b(A) = 0. 
If A is such that /3(A) < 0, then from the definition of /3, 6(A) > 0 and 
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f l(A) = -6(A) ,  that is, 6(A) = - f l (A) .  If A is such that f l (A) = 0, then 
from the definition of fl, 6(A) = 0. 
Theorems 3, 4, and 5 describe some properties of belief functions. Theorem 
3 confirms that a belief function does contain redundant information. 
THEOREM 3 Suppose fl is a belief function for  g. Then for  any 
proposition A ~ ~g , fl( A ) = - f l ( -  A ). 
Proof Let 6 be the disbelief unction corresponding to ft. First consider the 
case where 6(A) > 0. In this case, it follows from condition D4 in Proposition 
2 that 6( -A)  = 0. From the definition of a belief function, f l(A) = -6 (A) ,  
and f l ( -A )  = 6( -  ( -A ) )  = 6(A).  Therefore the result follows. The proof 
is similar for the case 6(A) = 0. 
In Definition 4, we defined a belief function in terms of a disbelief unction. 
Theorem 4 shows that the class of belief functions can be characterized without 
reference to disbelief functions, and in doing so, one can see why belief 
functions are not as easy to work with as disbelief unctions. 
THEOREM 4 A function fl:2 •g "-* 72+ is a belief unction if  and only if  
there exists a proper subset D of  ~¢g such that 
B0. fl({w}) ~ 72 for all w ~ ~,g. 
B1. fl({w}) < 0 for all weD 
B2. fl( A ) 
(-1) MIN {-fl({w})Iwea} i fAc_D 
= MIN { - f l ({w}) Iw e -A  } i fAD_ -D, i .e . , -Ac_D 
0 otherwise 
for all A ~(2'~g - {Q,  ~g}). 
B3. fl(Q~) = -oo, and fl(~g) = +~.  
Proof (Sufficiency) Let /3 be a function satisfying conditions B0-B3. To 
show that fl is a belief function, we need to construct a disbelief unction 6 
such that fl( A)  = -6 (  A) if 6( A) > 0 and fl( A) = 6( -  A)  if 6(A) = 0. 
Let 6 be a disbelief unction defined as follows: 
6({w})  = - f l ({w}) i fw~D and 6({w})= 0 i fw~-D.  
Since D is a proper subset of ~/g, from B0 and B1, clearly 6 is a disbelief 
function. 
Suppose Q~ =¢ A c_ D. This means that 6({w}) = -fl({w}) > 0 for all 
w ~ A. Therefore, 
6 (A)  = MIN{6({w}) [weA} >0.  
By condition B2, 
fl(A) = ( - I )M IN  {- f l ({w})]w~A} 
= ( - I )M IN  {6({w}) [w~A} = -~(A). 
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Now suppose A q: ~ and A _D - D, that is, Q :~ - A c_ D. In this case 
6(A) = 0, and from B1, 6({w}) = -/3({w}) for all w e -A .  From B2, 
/3(A) = MIN { - /3 ({w}) Iwe-a}  = MIN {~5({w})[we-A} = 6( -A) .  
Finally, suppose that A e (2 ~g - { Q~, ~g}) such that A is neither a subset 
of D nor contains -D .  Since A is not a subset of D, 6(A) = 0, and since 
A does not contain -D ,  6(-A) = 0. From B2, /3(A) = 0 = 6( -A) .  
Since 6(Q) = +oo > 0, we need to show that ~3(O) = -6 (0)  = -oo. 
This is true from B3. Since 6(#g) = 0, we need to show that /3(~g) = 6( -  
~g) = 6(0)  = +oo. This is also true from B3. This completes the sufficiency 
part of the proof. 
(Necessity) Suppose /3 is a belief function corresponding to some disbelief 
function 6. Condition B0 follows from condition DO and Definition 4. Condi- 
tion B1 is obvious from Definition 4 if we let D = {w e #g [ 6({w}) > 0}. 
The proof of B2 is similar to the proof in the sufficiency part. And B3 is 
obvious from condition D3 and Definition 4. 
Note that the proper subset D is the complement of the content of the 
consistent epistemic state represented by /3. Thus a belief function is specified 
completely by its values for each configuration in D. Furthermore, from 
condition B2, it follows that a proposition is believed if and only if it contains 
the content, is disbelieved if and only if it is a subset of D, and is neither 
believed nor disbelieved otherwise. This is consistent with Theorem 1 and its 
corollary. 
The following theorem describes marginalization for belief functions. 
THEOREM 5 Suppose 6 is a disbelief function for g, and suppose h c_ g. 
Let ~ and {3 ~h be belief unctions for g and h, respectively, correspond- 
ing to disbelief functions 6 and 6 ~h, respectively. Then 
f3*h({x}) = ~3({x}~g) f°r a l lxe  YC'h 
Proof First suppose x e #h is such that 6~h({x}) > 0. Then /~h({x}) = 
-~h({x}).  Also, since 6({x} rg) = 6~h({x}) by definition of marginalization 
of disbelief unctions, 
: _6 ({x}  ' , )  = : 
Next consider the case x E ~h such that 6~h({x}) = 0. Then, 
/~h({x}) = ~h(~ {X}) = MIN {~h({y}) [y  ~ #h -- {X}} 
= MIN {6({y}~g)lY ~ ~¢h - {x}} = ~( -  ({x}~g)) = ) 
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6. REVISION OF DISBELIEFS 
In this section, first we state Spohn's A,o~-conditionalization rule for 
modifying a disbelief unction in light of new information. Then we describe 
four properties of this rule. Finally, we describe the general X-conditionaliza- 
tion rule. 
DEFINITION 5 [1, P. 117] Suppose ~ is a disbelief unction for g 
representing our initial epistemic state. Suppose we learn something 
about contingent proposition A (or -A )  that consequently eads us to 
believe A to degree ~ (or, equivalently, disbelieve -A  to degree a), 
where a ~ ~. The resulting epistemic state, called the A, tx-conditionali- 
zation of  ~ and denoted by disbelief unction ~A.~, is defined as 
follows: 
= , ({w})  +. -  
i fw ~A 
i fwCA 
for all w e ~.  
Spohn [1] describes four properties of this rule. Let /5 and /3A.,, denote the 
belief functions corresponding to ~ and 8A,~, respectively. First note that 
5A,~(A) = 0 and 8A,~(--A) = o~. Therefore, BA.~(A) = or. This means that 
if B(A) < el, then what we have learned about A (or -A )  increases our 
belief in A. However, if /5(A) > ct, then what we have learned about A 
decreases our belief in A. Finally, if /3(A) = ~x, then the beliefs remain 
unchanged after revision, that is, 8A,~ = ~ [1, p. 118]. 
Second, since learning about A (or -A )  does not discriminate between 
propositions contained in A, the relative degrees of disbelief of these proposi- 
tions are unchanged; that is, ~(E) - 5(E') = ~A,~(E) -- ~A.~(E') for all E, 
E' c_ A. Also, since learning about A does not discriminate between proposi- 
tions contained in - A,  the relative degrees of disbelief of these propositions 
are also unchanged. What has changed is that the degrees of disbelief of 
propositions contained in -A  have shifted upwards relative to propositions 
contained in A [1, p. 117]. 
Before we continue with the properties of the belief revision rule, let us 
illustrate the rule with an example. 
EXAMPLE 4 (A-o~-conditionalization rule) Consider the situation in Example 
2. Suppose our initial epistemic state is as given by dt in Table 2. Suppose that 
after a brief conversation with the stranger, we now believe that the person is a 
Republican to degree 3. In this case, A = {(r,q,p), ( r ,q , -p ) ,  ( r , -  q,p), 
( r , -  q , -p )} ,  ot = 3, tS(A) = 0, and tS(- A) = 0. Then the revised disbelief 
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w ,({w}) ~'({w}) ,"({w}) 
(r,q,p) 1 1 0 
(r,q, -p )  2 2 1 
(r, - q,p) 1 1 4 
(r, -q ,  -p )  0 0 3 
( - r ,q ,p )  0 3 2 
( - r ,q ,  -p )  2 5 4 
( -  r, -q ,p )  0 3 6 
( - r , -q , -p )  0 3 6 
function, denoted say by 6', is shown in Table 4. Note that according to our 
epistemic state 6', we now believe that the person is not a pacifist (to degree 1) 
and not a Quaker (to degree 1). 
Suppose after further conversation with the stranger we now believe that the 
person is a Quaker to degree 3. In this case, A = {(r ,q,p) ,  ( r ,q , -p ) ,  
- r ,q ,p ) ,  ( - r ,q , -p )} ,  c~ = 3, b'(A) = 1, and 6 ' ( -A )  = 0. The revised 
disbelief unction is denoted by 6" and is also shown in Table 4. According to 
the epistemic state 6", we now believe that the person is a pacifist (to degree 
1), a Republican (to degree 2), and a Quaker (to degree 3). 
Third, A,c~-conditionalization s reversible. Suppose 6 is a disbelief unc- 
tion with corresponding belief function /3, suppose A is a contingent proposi- 
tion, and suppose ~(A) = 7. Then (6A,~x)A,,  Y = (6 A,e*)A,3, = 6 [1, p. 118]. 
In words, suppose the initial belief of proposition A is 3' in epistemic state & 
Suppose we learn something about A that leads us to believe A to degree a. 
The resulting epistemic state is given by 6A. ~. Suppose that we learn some- 
thing more about proposition A that has the effect of negating what we learned 
previously, that is, we now believe A to degree 3' again. Then the resulting 
epistemic s ta te  (~A.c*)A.'I is the same as the epistemic state ~ that we started 
with initially. 
Fourth, A,cx-conditionalization s partially commutative. If ~ is a disbelief 
function, and A and B are contingent propositions uch that 6(A fq B) = 
6(A f'l -B )  = 6( -A  f'l B) = 0, then (6A,a)B,3,  = (~B.7)A, a for all or, /~  
[1, p. 118]. Clearly, A,ot-conditionalization is not always commutative. 
Example 5 illustrates a case where belief revision is not commutative, and 
Example 6 illustrates a case where belief revision is commutative. 
EXAMPLE 5 (Noncommutative b lief revision) Let S be a variable with 
frame { s, - s}  where S = s represents hat it is snowing outside and S = -s  
represents hat it is not snowing outside. Suppose my initial epistemic state is 
complete ignorance (it is 5:55 a.m., the radio-alarm hasn't urned on yet, and 
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the curtains are drawn across the window) represented by disbelief unction 6 
such that ~({s}) = 6({-s})  = 0. At 6:00 a.m., the radio turns on and the 
announcer states that it is now snowing in the city. Here, A = { s}, and, say, 
a = 1. Then 6A.~({S}) = 0 and 6A,~({ --S}) = 1. Next, at 6:05, suppose I get 
up and open the curtains and observe that although there is a blanket of snow 
on the ground and the wind in blowing hard and moving the snow around, it 
does not seem like it is actually snowing outside. But it is still dark outside and 
hard to tell for sure. Here, B = { -s}  and, say, 7 = 1. Then (6A,~,)S,v({S}) 
= 1 and (~A.~,)B../({S})= 0. Note that 6s,~({s})= 1, ~B.~({-s})= 0, and 
(~B,7)A,ot({S}) = 0, (~B,3,)A,ot( { - -S})  = 1. Thus, (~A,ot)B,v :~= (~B,'y)a,ot" Note 
that A and B do not satisfy the conditions tated above for revision to the 
commutative. Lack of commutativity in this case is not a problem. It is clear 
from the story that my belief about S at 6:05 a.m. is accurately represented by 
(6A,~)B, v and not by (6B,v)A. ~. The disbelief function (6B,7)A, ~ is meaningless 
in the context of the story. 
EXAMPLE 6 (Commutative belief revision) Suppose G is a variable with 
frame {gx, gy, gz}" A crime has been committed, and there are three 
suspects: x, y, and z. G = gx represent the proposition that suspect x is 
guilty, etc. Suppose my initial epistemic state is complete ignorance repre- 
sented by disbelief unction 6 such that 
6({gx} ) = 6({gy}) = 6({gz} ) = 0 
First, after interviewing suspect x, who has a weak alibi, I disbelieve {gx} to 
degree 1, that is, A = { gy, gz} and ot = 1. My disbelief unction now is 
6A.~({gx} ) = 1 6A,,~({gy}) =6A.~,({gz} ) =0 
Next, after interviewing suspect y, who has a stronger alibi, I now disbelieve 
{ gy} to degree 2, that is, B = { gx, gz}, 7 = 2. Then 
(6A,~)n.,({gx}) = 1, (6A.~)B,v({gy}) = 2, (~A,ot)B,',/({gz}) =0 
Note that A and B satisfy the conditions required for commutativity, namely, 
Note that 
6(A n B) = 6(A n -B )  = 6( -A  n B) = o. 
and 
6B.,({gx} ) =0,  6B.,({gx} ) = 2, 6B,,({gz} ) =0 
(6B,7)A,ot({gx})= l' (6B,2/)A,et({gy}) =2 , (6B.3,)A.ot({gz})=O. 
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Thus, (6A,~)B, v = (6B,v)~4,, ~.Given what we learned from interviewing sus- 
pects x and y, the fact that we interviewed suspect x before suspect y has no 
bearing on the final epistemic state. 
In Definition 5, a belief revision rule was stated in terms of a single 
proposition A that was believed to degree a. Spohn [2, p. 318] has general- 
ized this definition to the case where the information gained may concern more 
than a single proposition. Spohn calls this general belief revision rule h-condi- 
tionalization, where ~ is the marginal of the resulting disbelief unction for 
some subset h of variables. Here is a formal definition. 
DEFINITION 6 [2, l'. 318] Suppose 6 is a disbelief function for g 
representing our initial epistemic state. Suppose we learn something 
about variables in set h that consequently eads us to an epistemic state 
represented by a disbelief unction 6 x for  g t3 h such that 6*x h = )~, 
where 9~ is a disbelief function for h. Then the epistemic state 6ix, called 
the X-conditionalization o f  6, is defined as follows: 
6x({(w,u,v)}) = 6({(w,u)})  + X({Iu,v)} ) - 6({u} ~g) 
for  all we ~g-h, U e ~gNh, V e '~h-g" 
It is easy to show that 6 x is indeed a disbelief unction. Furthermore, it is 
also obvious that 6x ~h = X. Note that A,a-conditionalization is a special case 
of )~-conditionalization where ~, is a disbelief function for g such that 
~{w}) = 0 if weA and ~({w}) = ol if w~A.  As noted by Spohn [2, p. 
318], k-conditionalization is the analog of Jeffrey's rule in probability theory 
[13, chap. 11]. 
7. BELIEF REVISION AS A RULE OF COMBINATION 
In this section, first, we describe a rule of combination. Second, we show 
that Spohn's rule for modifying a disbelief unction in light of new information 
can be expressed in terms of this rule of combination. 
DEFINITION 7 (A RULE OF COMBINATION) Suppose 61 and 62 are disbelief 
functions for  gl and g2, respectively. The combination of  61 and 62, 
denoted by 61 • 62, is a disbelief unction for  g~ U g2 defined as 
follows: 
( 61~ 62)( {wI ) = 61( {w'l'gl } ) -l- 62( {w'Lgz} ) - K (2) 
for  all w e ~gl u g2' where 
K = MIN {61({w+gl}) + 62({w+gE})lwe #glUg2} 
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K is a normalization factor that ensures that 61 • 6 2 is a disbelief unction. 
Thus, combination consists of pointwise addition followed by normalization. 
We will now show that Spohn's rule for belief revision as described in the 
previous section can be expressed in terms of the rule of combination. 
THEOREM 6 Suppose 6 i is an initial disbelief function for g, suppose (3 i
is the corresponding belief function, and suppose h c_ g. Suppose we 
learn something about some contingent proposition A o f  h. Let 6f 
denote the revised disbelief unction for g, and let /3f denote the 
corresponding belief unction. Suppose ~)h( A) = a, where ~ ~ ~; that 
is, after revising our beliefs, we believe proposition A to degree ~. 
Then, depending on the value of/3~h(A), there exists an appropriate 
disbelief function 6"`  for  h such that 6f = 6 t • 6"`. 
Proof Let us consider the following cases. 
Case (i): 0 </3)h(A)  < a In this case, whatever we have learned has 
resulted in an increase or belief for A from degree /3/~h(A) to degree a. 
Define a disbelief unction 6"` for h as follows: 
6A{x}) = {0 i fx~A 
(cz - /3/*h(A)) i f x6A 
6"` represents the disbelief function representation of what is actually learned. 
Since /3)h( A) >_ O, we have 
6*ih( A) = 6i( A tg) = 0 
and 
6i ( -  A 'g) =/3i(A '8) = 13~h( A ) 
Therefore, from Definition 5 we have 
6f({w}) = (6 i ({w})+ (c~-  13)h(A)) 
i fw eA tg 
i fw~A ~g 
Note that w e A ~ g iff w ~ h e A,  and w ¢ A t g iff w ~ h ~ A. From the defini- 
tion of combination, clearly, 6i • 6"` = 6f. Since 6i(A tg) = 0, the normaliza- 
tion constant K = 0. 
Case (ii): 0 _< o~ _< ~*ih(A) In this case, whatever we have learned has 
resulted in a decrease in belief for A from degree/3/*h(A) to degree or. Define 
the disbelief unction 6,, for h as follows: 
~h(A) -- ol i f x~A 
6"`({x}) = 0 i f xdA 
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Since f3~h(A) > O, we have 
~,'~(A) = ~;( A ~)  = 0 
and 
~i( -A  *~) = j3i(A ,g) = 13~h(A) > 0 
Therefore, from Definition 5, we have 
[cSi({w}) i fw•A '~ 
cSf({w}) = (fii({w}) + (~ - /3~h(A)) i fw6Atg  
We will now show that 5 i °  5a=f i f .  Note that since ~i(A ~)=0 and 
~i(-A ?g) > O, 
{w• ~ I ~ , ({w}) :0}  ___A'~ 
Therefore, after pointwise addition of (5 i and ~5 a, the normalization constant 
K - -  ~h(A)  - c~. From the definition of combination, we have 
/6i({w}) + (13~h(A) - ~) -- K i fw•A 'g 
(~i * ~A)({W}) = (~i ({W})  "4- 0 -- K i fw6A tg 
for all w • ~g. Since K = /3~n(A) - c~, we get the result. 
Case (iii): 13~h(A) <_ 0 <_ ol In this case, whatever we have learned has 
resulted in an increase of belief for A. Define the disbelief unction 6a for h 
as follows: 
~({x})  = / 0 i fx•A  
ot - /3/~h(A) i fx6A ( 
Since 13~h(A) _< 0, 5/*h(A) = ~Si(A *g) = -~h(A)  > O, and 5 i ( -A  tg) 
= 0. Therefore, from Definition 5, we have 
'(~i({W}) + ~ih(A) i fw•A *g 
~i({w}) + a i fw6A tg 
We will now show that 5i * 5a = 5f. First notice that after pointwise 
addition, the normalization constant K = --/5/~h(A). This is because 
MIN {~Si({w})lw•A*g} = 5i(A*g) = --/3/~h(A) 
and 
MIN {5i({w}) + c~ - 15 /~h(A) [w•-A  *g} = a - j3~h(A). 
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Therefore, from the definition of combination we have 
(6i O 6A)({W}) = '6i({W}) + /3/~h(A) i fwEA Sg 
6i({w}) + (~ i fw¢A *g 
= 6/{w})  
for all w • ~¢g. 
Thus in all three cases, which is an exhaustive list, belief revision reduces to 
the rule of combination. 
In the next section we will show that our rule of combination and Spohn's 
h-conditionalization are mathematically equivalent. But first we pause for a 
numerical example to illustrate Theorem 6. 
EXAMPLE 7 (A,  a-conditionalization as a rule of combination) Consider the 
example of belief revision given in Example 4. The initial epistemic state is 
given by the disbelief unction 6 for { R,Q,P}. Since the initial belief for 
proposition {r} is 0 and the belief after the first evidence is 3, we can describe 
what we have learned from the first body of evidence by disbelief unction 6~, 
for { R} as follows: 
6",({r}) =0 and 6~({- r})  = 3 
Note that the resulting disbelief unction 6' = 6 .6~ (the normalization con- 
stant in this combination is K = 0). 
As per 6', we disbelieve {q} to degree 1. After the second body of 
evidence, we believe { q} to degree 3. Therefore, what we have learned from 
the second body of evidence can be represented by disbelief unction 6'( for 
{Q} as follows: 
~'(({ q}) = 0 and 6a"({ - q}) = 4 
Note that 6" = 6' * 6,x" (the normalization constant in this combination is 
K= 1). 
8. A RULE OF SUBTRACTION 
In this section, first, we define a rule of subtraction for disbelief unctions. 
Second, we show that we can always recover the incremental disbelief function 
from the final and initial disbelief unctions. Third, we show the mathematical 
equivalence between Spohn's ),-conditionalization and our rule of combination. 
Spohn's belief revision rules were described in terms of the initial disbelief 
function 6 i and characteristics of the final disbelief unction (proposition A 
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and its degree of belief a in A,  ot-conditionalization a d disbelief unction h 
in h-condifionalization). On the other hand, the rule of combination describes 
the final disbelief function in terms of the initial disbelief function and the 
incremental disbelief function representing the evidence. If we are given the 
initial and the final disbelief unction, can we always recover the incremental 
disbelief unction? The answer is yes and is stated below as Theorem 7. First 
we need a definition. 
DEFINITION 8 (A RULE OF SUBTRACTION) Suppose 51 is a disbelief func- 
tion for g, suppose ~2 is a disbelief function for h, and suppose h c_ g. 
Then the subtraction of  82 from 5~, denoted by 51 - 52 , is a disbelief 
function for g given by 
(51  - = - - 
for all w ~ ~g, where K is a normalization constant given by 
K = MIN {5,({w}) - 52({wSh}) Jwe ~g} 
It is clear from the definition of the normalization constant K that ~1 - 52 is 
a disbelief unction. The next theorem states that we can recover the incremen- 
tal disbelief unction from the initial and final disbelief unctions. 
THEOREM 7 Suppose 5 i and 6a are disbelief unctions for g and h, 
respectively. Then 
( (5 i  ~ (~A) -- ~i) +h : 5A 
Proof Suppose w ~ ~h. Then 
((5 i • 5a) - 5i)~h({w/) 
---- ((5i * 5~) -- 5; ) ( (W/ ' '~°h')  
= MIN {((5i • 5a) - 5 i ) ({z}) ]z~ {w} TtgUh'} 
= MIN {(5i * 5a)({z}) - 5i({zSg}) - K 1 [z~ {w} ~tguh~} 
= MIN {5i({z~g}) + 5a({zSh}) -- K 2 
= MIN {6a({z~h}) -  K 2 - K 1 [ze  {w} rtguh~} 
=6a({w})  -K  a -K ,  (s incez~h= wfora l l ze{w} *(guh') 
172 Prakash P. Shenoy 
Table 5. The Rule of Subtraction 
w ,~'({w}) , r ({w})  (,s" - ,~')({w}) 
(r,q,p) 1 0 0 
(r,q, -p )  2 1 0 
( r , -q ,p )  1 4 4 
( r , -q , -p )  0 3 4 
( - r ,q ,p )  3 2 0 
( - r ,q , -p )  5 4 0 
( - r ,  -q ,p )  3 6 4 
( - r , -q , -p )  3 6 4 
The normalization constant  K 1 in the subtraction operation simplifies as 
follows: 
K, = MIN {(6 /*  6a) ({z})  - ~i ({zSg})]  ze  ~/goh} 
= MIN {$/({z*g}) + 6a({zSh}) - K 2 - 8 i ({z 'g}) [  ze  WgOh} 
= MIN {6a({z*h}) -- K 2 Ize ~oh} 
= MIN { 6a({z *h})l z ~ Wg U h} - K2 
= -K  2 (since 6A is a disbelief unction) 
Therefore, ((6 i , 6~) - 6i) *h = 6A. 
COROLLARY TO THEOREM 7 Suppose 6 is a disbelief unction for  g, 
suppose 6~ is a disbelief unction for  h, and suppose h c_ g. Then 
(6 - 6~) , 6~ = 6. 
Proof Suppose 6 is a disbelief function for g, suppose 6~ is a disbelief 
function for h, and suppose h c_ g. Let u ¢ ~_  h, V ~ Wh" Then 
((~ - ~)  * 6~)({(u ,v)})  
= (6 - 6A)({(u,v)} ) + 6A({v}) - K 1 
= ~({(u ,v )})  - 6A({v}) - r~  + 6~({,,}) - /~1 
= ~({(u ,v )} )  - r~  - K ,  
As in the proof of Theorem 7, it is easy to show that K 1 = -K  2 . Hence the 
proof follows. 
The following example illustrates the rule of subtraction. 
EXAMPLE 8 Consider the disbelief functions 6' and 6" for {R,Q,P}  from 
Example 4 reproduced in Table 5. Table 5 also shows the disbelief function 
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8" - 8'. The normalization constant in this case is K = - t .  Also, notice that 
(8" - 8') ~IQ) is the same as 8~( described in Example 7. 
The property of disbelief functions of being always able to recover the 
addendum from the sum is unique to this theory and is not shared either by 
probability theory or by the Dempster-Shafer theory of belief functions. This 
property is useful for two reasons. First, in cases where it is easier to describe 
evidence by reference to the final disbelief unction, we can always recover the 
incremental belief function that represents just the evidence. Second, this 
property is useful in nonmonotonic reasoning because it allows us to retract he 
conclusion of an earlier inference without influencing conclusions drawn using 
other means (see e.g., Ginsberg [141). 
We now have the necessary tools to prove that Spohn's X-conditionalization 
and our rule of combination are mathematically equivalent. 
THEOREM 8 Suppose 8 is a disbelief function for  g and X is a disbelief 
function for  h. Let 8 x denote the X-conditionalization f 8. Then there 
exists a disbelief function 8zx for  h such that 8 • 8:~ = 5 x. Conversely, 
suppose 8 is a disbelief function for  g and 8 a is a disbelief function for  
h. Then there exists a disbelief function ~ for  h such that 8× = 8 • 8~. 
Proof (=)  Suppose 8 is a disbelief function for g and ~, is a disbelief 
function for h. Note that 8 x is a disbelief function for g LI h. Define 
8~ = (8×-  8) ~h. Letwe ~tg_h, ue ~gf)h, andve  )~'h g" Then 
(8 * 8~)({(w,u ,v)})  = 8({(w,u)})  + (Sx - 8)~h({(U,V)}) -- Z<, 
Simplifying the second term on the right-hand side, we get 
-- ) 
= MIN {(8 x - 6 ) ({ (x ,u ,v )} ) ]x~ ~g ,} 
= MIN {Sx({(x,u,v)} ) - 5 ({(x ,u)})  - K2 ixe  ~'g-h} 
= MIN {8({(x ,u)})  + X({(u,v)}) - 8({u} *g) 
= MIN {X({(u ,v )} )  - 8 ({u}  'g) -- K2]x6  ~¢g-h} 
- -  x ({ (u ,v )} )  - - 
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Therefore we have 
(~ ~ ~) ({(w,u ,v )})  
= ~({(w,u)}) + X({(u,v)}) - ~({u} TM) - K~ - K, 
= 6x({(w,u,v)}) - K 2 - K. 
The normalization constant K~ in the combination operation simplifies as 
follows: 
K, = MIN {~({(w,u)}) + (~x-  ~)'h({(u,v)}) ] (w,u,v) ~ ~uh} 
= MIN {8({(w,u)}) + k({(u,v)}) 
-5({u} TM) - K2 [ (w,u,v) e ~¢/~u h} 
= MIN {Sx({(w,u,v)}))(w,u,v)e ~/guh} - K2 
= -K  2 (since 8 x is a disbelief unction) 
Therefore 8 • 8zx = 8 x. 
(=)  Suppose 8 is a disbelief unction for g and 8,x is a disbelief unction for 
h. Define k to be (8 • 8a) ~h. We need to show that the k-conditionalization f 
8 isindeed 8 • 8 a. Le tw~ ~/g-h, U~ ~nh,  andv~ ~h-g" Then 
8x({(w,u,v) }) 
: 8 ({ (w,u)})  + (8 • 8~)~({(n ,v )})  - 8 ({~} TM) 
: 8 ({ (w,u)})  + (8 • 8~)({(u ,v )}  ~° ' , )  - ~({u} TM) 
= 8({(w,u)}) + MIN {(8 $ 8z~)({(x,u,v)}  I x e ~Fg_ h} - (3({u} TM) 
= 8({(w,u)}) + MIN {8({(x,u)}) + 8a({(u,v)} ) 
-K lxe  ,~._~} - 8(In/TM) 
:~({(w,u)})  +MIN{8({(x ,u )}) lxe~_h} 
+ ~a({(~,v)})  - ~:- ~({u} TM) 
= 8({(w,u)})  + 8a({(u ,v )})  - K 
= (8 • 8~) ({(w,u .v )} )  
9. PROPERTIES OF THE COMBINATION RULE 
In this section, we discuss several important properties of the combination 
rule described in Section 7. First, we state some elementary properties of the 
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Table 6. Spohn's Rule for Belief Revision as a Rule of Combination 
W t~l ~2 ~1 ~ t~2 ~3 ~l ~ ~2 19 6 3 
S 0 0 0 2 1 
--S 0 1 1 0 0 
rule of combination. Second, we describe how the rule of combination can be 
used to construct a disbelief unction for many variables from independent 
disbelief unctions each of which involves only a few variables. We sketch 
what we mean by independent disbelief functions. Third, we show that Spohn's 
theory of disbelief unctions fits into the same abstract framework as that for 
the theory of probability and the Dempster-Shafer theory of belief functions. 
First, we state some elementary properties of the rule of combination. 
PROPOSITION 3 The rule of combination described in (2) has the follow- 
ing properties 
C1. (Commutativity) 6~ • 6 2 : 6 2 ~ 61. 
C2. (Associativity) (61 • 62) • 63 = 61 • (62 • 63). 
C3. If tS~ is vacuous, then 6~ • 62 = 62. 
C4. In general, 61 • 61 ~: 61. The disbelief unction 61 • 6~ disbelieves 
the same propositions as 6~, but it will do so with twice the degree, 
as it were. 
Proof All four properties follow trivially from the definition of combina- 
tion. 
Note that although Spohn's belief revision rule is partially commutative, the 
rule of combination is always commutative. There is no conflict here. Spohn's 
belief revision rule is described in terms of the initial epistemic state and some 
features of the final epistemic state. On the other hand, the rule of combination 
describes belief revision in terms of the initial epistemic state and the epistemic 
state representing the evidence. Thus commutativity for Spohn's rule and 
commutativity for the rule of combination are two different relations. The 
following example illustrates this for the noncommutative b lief revision case 
of Example 5. 
EXAMPLE 9 (Noncommutative b lief revision as a commutative combination) 
Consider the story of Example 5. The initial epistemic state for S is the 
vacuous disbelief function represented by 6~ in Table 6. Following the weather 
announcement, I now believe that it is snowing to degree 1. Using the rule of 
subtraction, the incremental epistemic state representing the weather announce- 
ment, denoted by 62, is shown in Table 6. The current epistemic state is given 
by t51 • 62. After I look out the window, I now believe that it is not snowing 
to degree 1. Again, using the rule of subtraction, the incremental epistemic 
state representing the evidence obtained from looking out the window, denoted 
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by 83, is shown in Table 6. The final epistemic state is given by 81 • 82 • 83. 
Note thatS~ • 8 2 • 8 3 =8~ • 8 3 • 8 2 . 
Second, the rule of combination is valid not only for belief revision but also 
for the construction of an initial disbelief function for many variables when this 
information is given in terms of independent disbelief functions each of which 
is for small number of variables. What do we mean by independent disbelief 
functions. Here, we will just sketch an answer by analogy with the theory of 
probability and the Dempster-Shafer theory of belief functions. A complete 
answer merits a separate paper. 
By independent beliefs, we mean the same as in the theory of probability and 
the Dempster-Shafer theory of belief functions. In probability theory, beliefs 
are represented by functions called potentials, and the rule of combination is
pointwise multiplication (see, e.g., Refs. 10 and 11). However, combining two 
potentials gives us meaningful results only when the potentials being combined 
are independent. For example, suppose we have two variables X and Y with 
frames {x,-x} and {y,-y}, respectively. Consider a potential Pl = 
(p(x),p(-x)) for X, representing a (prior) probability distribution for X. 
Consider another potential P2 = (P(Y[ x), P(-Yl x), p(y[ -x), P(-Yl 
-x) )  for { X, Y}, representing the conditional distributions for Y given X. 
In this case, the potentials Pl and P2 are independent. Combining these 
pointwise multiplication, denoted by ®, gives us the joint potential p~ ®P2 
for { X, Y} as follows 
(p(Ylx)p(x), p(-Ylx)p(x), P(Yl -x )p( -x ) ,  P(-Yl - x)p(-x)) 
We recognize this potential as the joint probability distribution for { X, Y}. 
Consider another potential P3 = (P(Y), P(-Y)) for Y representing a proba- 
bility distribution of Y. In general, Pl and P3 are not independent. If we 
combine these two potentials, the result 
Pl ®P3 = (p(x)p(y), p(x)p(-y),  p(-x)p(y),  p( -x)p( -y))  
does not necessarily represent pooling of evidence. We know from probability 
theory that p~ ® P3 represents combination of evidence if and only if X and 
Y are probabilistically independent, that is, if and only if Pl and P3 are 
independent potentials. 
In the Dempster-Shafer theory, Dempster's rule for combining belief 
functions represents pooling of evidence only when the belief functions being 
combined are independent. Shafer [15, 16] has described in detail precisely 
what is meant by independent belief functions in terms of canonical examples 
for belief functions. In fact, most of the examples that Pearl [17, pp. 447-450] 
describes to show that application of Dempster's rule given nonintuitive r sults 
do so precisely because the belief functions being combined are not indepen- 
dent. 
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Spohn's theory of disbelief unctions is closely analogous to the theory of 
probability (see Spohn [2, pp. 318-320] for a comparison of his theory with 
probability theory). Analogous to the concept of probabilistic onditional 
independence, Spohn [1, pp. 120-125; 2, p. 318] has described conditional 
independence for disbelief unctions. As in the probabilistic ase, Hunter [18] 
has shown that the conditional independence r lation for disbelief unctions 
forms a "graphoid" (see, e.g., Geiger and Pearl [19] or Verma and Pearl [20] 
for definition of a graphoid). Using the notion of conditional independence, we 
can define when two disbelief functions are independent by direct analogy with 
the theory of probability. 
EXAMPLE 10 (Construction of an initial disbelief function) Consider two sets 
of beliefs as follows: 
1. Most Republicans are not pacifists. 
2. Most Quakers are pacifists. 
Suppose further that these two sets of beliefs are independent. Then, if 6~ is a 
disbelief representation f the first set of beliefs and 62 is a disbelief represen- 
tation of the second set of beliefs, then 61 • 62 will represent the aggregation 
of these two sets of beliefs. In particular, suppose 6~ is a disbelief function for 
{ R, P} as follows: 
6,({(r,p)} i = 1 
~l({( r , - -p )})  = 6 , ({ ( - r ,p )} )  = 6 l ({ ( - - r , - -p )} )  = 0 
(i.e., we disbelieve pacifist Republicans), and suppose 62 is a disbelief function 
for {Q,P} as follows: 
62({(q , -P )} )  =2 
62({(q,p)}) = 62({( -q ,p )}  ) = 62({( -q , -p )}  ) = 0 
(i.e., we disbelieve nonpacifist Quakers). Then the disbelief unction 6~ • 6 z 
= 6, say, shown in Table 2, represents he aggregate belief. Note that there is 
no belief revision going on here. Of course, Theorem 8 tells us that we can 
mathematically describe the aggregation of 6~ and 62 using X-conditionaliza- 
tion (X is the same as 6 z for this example). But in general, it is neither 
practical nor intuitive. 
Third, as per our reformulation, Spohn's theory of epistemic beliefs shares 
the essential abstract features of probability theory and the Dempster-Shafer 
theory of belief functions as described by Shenoy and Shafer [10, 11]. These 
features are (1) a functional representation f knowledge (or beliefs), (2) a rule 
of marginalization, and (3) a rule of combination. In Refs. 10 and 11, we also 
state three axioms for the marginalization and combination rules that enable 
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one to use local computations in the calculation of the marginals of a joint 
disbelief function with explicitly having to compute the joint disbelief function. 
These three axioms are as follows (stated in the notation of disbelief functions). 
L1. (Commutativity and Associativity of Combination) Suppose 6 l, 62, 
and 63 are disbelief functions for g, h, and k respectively. Then, 
~l O 62 = 62 O 61, 
and 
(61 • 62) * 63 = 61 O (62 * 63) 
L2. (Consonance of Marginalization) Suppose 6 is a disbelief function for 
g, and suppose k c_ h c_ g. Then 
(6*h) *k = 6*k 
L3. (Distributivity of Marginalization over Combination) Suppose 6~ and 
62 are disbelief functions for g and h, respectively, Then 
(61 * 62) J'g --'-- 61 I~ (6L2(gNh') 
We have already shown that axioms L1 and L2 are valid for disbelief 
functions. Theorem 9 states that axiom L3 is also satisfied. 
THEOREM 9 Suppose 61 and 62 are disbelief functions for g and h, 
respectively. Then 
(6, , 62)"  = 61 • (6~ ('n~,) 
Proof Note that gUh = (g -  h) ( J (g f )h ) t J  (h -g ) ,  g= (g -  h) 
13 (g tq h), and h = (g fq h) 13 (h - g). Suppose we ~¢g-h, U~ ~gnh, and 
v ~ ~¢h-g. Then (w,u) e ~¢g and (u,v) e ~h. First, note that the normalization 
factor in the combination of the left-hand side, say K~, is the same as the 
normalization factor in the combination on the right-hand side, say K 2 , that is, 
K 1 = K 2, as shown below. 
K l = MIN {61({(w,u)} ) + 62({(u,v)}) I(w,u,v) ~ ~¢guh} 
= MIN {MIN { 61( {(W,U)} ) + 62({ (U,V) } )l v E '~/h_g} I (W,U) E ~g } 
= MIN {61({(w,u)} ) + MIN {62({(u,v)} ) Iv~ Wh-g} ](w, u) ~ ~¢/g} 
= MIN {6l({(w,u)} ) + (62*(gn~))({(u)})I(w,u)~ ~¢/g} 
= K 2 = K, say. 
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Next observe that 
= MIN {(6, (~ 82) ({(w,u ,v)}) lv  ~ ~h-g} 
= MIN {8,({(w,u)}) + 82({(u,v)} ) - K Iv6 ~h-g} 
= 6,({(w,u)}) + MIN {62({(u,v)} ) Iv~ ~h g} -- K 
= ~I ({ (W,U)})  -~- (~2~'gCIh) ) ({U})  -- K 
= (81 (~ (~2~(gOh' ) ) ({ (~/Y ,U)})  
Since all three axioms required for local computation of marginals are 
satisfied, the scheme described in Ref. 11 can be used for belief updating. 
Hunter [12] describes an analogous cheme for belief revision. 
10. DISCUSSION 
In Ref. 21 we describe a valuation-based language for representing and 
reasoning with knowledge. In such a language, knowledge is represented by 
functions called valuations, and inferences are made from the knowledge base 
using two operators called combination and marginalization. Combination 
corresponds to aggregation of knowledge, and marginalization corresponds to 
crystallization of knowledge. Conceptually, all the valuations are combined to 
obtain what is called the joint valuation. The marginals of the joint valuation 
are then found for each variable. If combination and marginalization perators 
satisfy three axioms, then the marginals of the joint valuation can be found 
using local computation without actually computing the joint valuation. In 
Refs. 10 and 11 we show that Bayesian probability theory and the 
Dempster-Shafer theory of belief functions fit in the abstract framework of 
valuation-based languages. In this paper, we have shown that Spohn's theory 
of epistemic beliefs also fits in this abstract framework. One implication of this 
is that we have a ready-made algorithm for propagating disbelief functions that 
used only local computation. Another implication is that we now have a better 
understanding of the sense in which Spohn's theory differs from probability 
theory and the Dempster-Shafer theory of belief functions (in the functional 
representation f knowledge, and rules of combination and marginalization), 
and the sense in which it is similar to these alternative theories of uncertain 
reasoning (the abstract features of the axiomatic framework). 
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